SQE1 Constitutional and Administrative Law Revision Guide 2026: Parliament, Judicial Review and Retained EU Law

Why Public Law deserves disciplined revision

Public Law sits inside FLK1 under the Legal System banner, and on paper it looks small. The number of black-letter rules is modest compared with Contract or Property. That is precisely why candidates lose marks here. The volume is low, but the cross-cutting reach is high: the SRA happily places a judicial review fact pattern alongside a tort or criminal procedure question, and it expects you to recognise the public-law angle without prompting. A claimant who thinks the local authority acted unfairly is not a tort claimant. A defendant arguing the prosecution breached Article 6 is not making a procedural application. If you cannot place the question in its constitutional frame within the first ten seconds, the rest of your reasoning collapses.

Public Law also rewards memorisation more than most subjects. The grounds of judicial review, the standing test, the time limits, the principal Convention rights, the priority order of constitutional principles — these are short, finite lists. Mastering them gives you reliable single-best-answer wins. Combine that with an understanding of how Miller (No 1), Miller (No 2) / Cherry and Privacy International sit alongside the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, and you turn Public Law into one of your highest-yield FLK1 chapters per hour invested.

If this guide is useful, pair it with the Contract Law revision guide — the two together cover most of what FLK1 tests on legal-system foundations and private-law obligations. Cross-reference the FLK1 vs FLK2 breakdown to see exactly how Public Law is weighted against the rest of your paper, and the hardest-subjects ranking for a sense of where it lands on candidate difficulty surveys.

The Public Law Syllabus

Bookmark the syllabus table and check off topics as you cover them. The SRA assessment specification is your map; this table is the legend.

The Sources and Nature of the UK Constitution

The UK constitution is uncodified, not unwritten. Most of it is written down — just not in a single document. You need to be confident in identifying the source category for any rule the question gives you, because the legal consequences differ.

Statutes of constitutional significance

Magna Carta 1297 (the surviving 1297 confirmation, not the 1215 charter), the Bill of Rights 1689, the Acts of Union 1707 and 1800, the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, the European Communities Act 1972 (repealed by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 with effect from "exit day"), the Human Rights Act 1998, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023. These statutes are not formally entrenched — Parliament can amend them through ordinary legislation — but the courts treat some as "constitutional statutes" that cannot be impliedly repealed (see Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin)).

Conventions

A convention is a non-legal rule binding political actors. The classic test is the Jennings test: is there a precedent; do those bound feel obliged; is there a constitutional reason for the rule? Examples include the convention that the monarch grants royal assent, the Salisbury Convention on manifesto bills, the convention of collective Cabinet responsibility, and the Sewel Convention on devolved consent. Conventions are not enforceable in court, even when they appear in statute (see Sewel discussion below).

The royal prerogative

A residual category of executive power not derived from statute. Modern examples include the conduct of foreign affairs, treaty-making, the deployment of the armed forces, the issue and revocation of passports, and the prerogative of mercy. Prerogative powers can be abolished or displaced by statute, and the courts review their exercise (see GCHQ below).

Common law

The judges' role in shaping constitutional principle remains substantial. Common-law fundamental rights, the principle of legality (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115) and the development of the grounds of judicial review are all common-law products.

Treaties and assimilated law

International treaties are not directly enforceable in domestic law unless incorporated by statute. Post-Brexit the body formerly known as "retained EU law" has been renamed "assimilated law" by the REUL Act 2023, with effect from 1 January 2024.

Parliamentary Sovereignty

Dicey's traditional formulation has three limbs: Parliament can make or unmake any law; no person or body has the right to override or set aside its legislation; and Parliament cannot bind its successors. This is your starting point. The exam will then test how the orthodoxy has been qualified.

Jackson and the limits of orthodoxy

In Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, the House of Lords obiter raised the possibility that there may be limits the courts would enforce — for example, an Act purporting to abolish judicial review of executive action. Lord Hope's judgment is the most-cited passage. Jackson did not actually strike anything down; the Hunting Act 2004 was upheld. But it remains a useful examiner trap: candidates over-state what Jackson decided. Get this right.

Manuel and earlier orthodoxy

In Manuel v Attorney General [1983] Ch 77, the Court of Appeal refused to question the validity of the Canada Act 1982. The case stands for the principle that a court will not look behind an Act of Parliament that is properly enacted.

EU membership and Factortame

In R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, the House of Lords disapplied a UK statute (the Merchant Shipping Act 1988) to give effect to directly applicable EU law. This was the high-water mark of qualification on Diceyan sovereignty.

Brexit and assimilated law

The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 repealed the European Communities Act 1972 and converted EU law in force on exit day into "retained EU law" (now "assimilated law"). The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023:

• Renamed retained EU law "assimilated law" from 1 January 2024.
• Abolished the supremacy of EU law over domestic law from the same date, except where expressly preserved.
• Removed general principles of EU law as a source of interpretation.
• Provided a sunset for specified retained EU instruments (a targeted list, not a blanket sunset — the original blanket sunset was dropped during the Bill's passage). The remainder continues in force as assimilated law unless and until revoked or restated.
• Empowered ministers to revoke, restate or replace assimilated law by statutory instrument.

Be careful: the originally proposed wholesale sunset was replaced with a list of specific instruments. Saying "all EU law sunset on 31 December 2023" is wrong and will cost you a mark.

Separation of Powers

Montesquieu's tripartite division — legislature, executive, judiciary — is the exam's reference point, but the UK has never observed it strictly. Cabinet ministers sit in the legislature; the judiciary historically sat in the legislature too.

CRA 2005 reforms

The Constitutional Reform Act 2005:

• Reduced the office of the Lord Chancellor from a member of all three branches to (effectively) an executive minister; removed presiding-officer functions in the Lords.
• Created the UK Supreme Court (operational from 1 October 2009), removing the judicial function from the House of Lords.
• Established the Judicial Appointments Commission to insulate appointments from political control.
• Codified the duty on the Lord Chancellor and ministers to defend judicial independence (s.3).

Judicial immunity

In Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118, the Court of Appeal confirmed that judges acting in good faith within their jurisdiction are immune from personal liability. Immunity protects independence; it is not a licence for misconduct (judicial discipline runs through the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office).

The Rule of Law

The rule of law is referenced in s.1 CRA 2005 ("This Act does not adversely affect... the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law") but is not defined.

Dicey

Dicey identified three elements: no punishment without breach of law established before the ordinary courts; equality before the law; and the constitution as the result of judicial decisions on individual rights.

Bingham's eight principles

Lord Bingham, in The Rule of Law (2010), set out eight sub-principles: accessibility of law; questions of legal right resolved by law not discretion; equality before the law; ministers and officials exercising power within limits; protection of fundamental human rights; means of resolving civil disputes; fair adjudicative procedures; and compliance with international law obligations.

Raz's formal conception

Joseph Raz argued that the rule of law is a formal virtue concerning the form of laws (clarity, prospectivity, generality, stability, accessibility of courts), not their substantive content. A morally bad law can still satisfy the rule of law in the formal sense.

The exam may give you a fact pattern and ask which conception is engaged. Match Bingham (thick / substantive) and Raz (thin / formal) to the question's framing.

The Royal Prerogative

The prerogative is a residual category of executive power.

CCSU / GCHQ

In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, the House of Lords held that prerogative powers are reviewable in principle, but justiciability depends on subject matter. High-policy areas (national security, treaty-making, prerogative of mercy in some respects) may be non-justiciable, while operational decisions affecting individuals will be reviewable. The case also re-stated the grounds of judicial review.

Miller (No 1)

In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, the Supreme Court held that the government could not use the prerogative to give Article 50 notice because doing so would alter rights granted by statute (the ECA 1972). Statute trumps prerogative.

Miller (No 2) / Cherry

In R (Miller) v Prime Minister; Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41, the Supreme Court held that the prorogation of Parliament for five weeks was unlawful because it had the effect, without reasonable justification, of frustrating Parliament's constitutional functions. The decision affirmed that the prerogative is reviewable where it impinges on parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.

Statutory abrogation

Where statute covers the field, the prerogative is displaced (Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508).

Sources of Government Power

Primary legislation

Acts of Parliament — the supreme source of law in the UK.

Delegated (secondary) legislation

Made by ministers or other bodies under powers conferred by an enabling Act. The principal vehicle is the statutory instrument (SI). Types of parliamentary control include:

• Negative resolution procedure — the SI becomes law unless either House resolves to annul it within a defined period (usually 40 sitting days).
• Affirmative resolution procedure — the SI requires positive approval by both Houses (or the Commons alone for financial measures) before it can take effect or continue in force.
• Super-affirmative procedure — used for SIs of constitutional significance (e.g. under Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006); requires consultation, a draft published for scrutiny, and consideration of representations before the SI is laid for affirmative approval.

A Henry VIII clause is a provision in primary legislation that empowers a minister to amend or repeal primary legislation by SI. Courts construe such clauses narrowly given the constitutional concerns they raise.

Devolution Briefly

Three statutes establish the principal devolution settlements: the Scotland Act 1998 (as amended, notably by the Scotland Acts 2012 and 2016), the Government of Wales Act 2006 (extending the Welsh model into a reserved-powers settlement) and the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Each lists matters that are "reserved" or "excepted" to Westminster; everything not reserved or excepted is within the legislative competence of the devolved legislature. Common reserved matters include the constitution, foreign affairs, defence, immigration and (largely) UK-wide tax.

The Sewel Convention — that Westminster will not normally legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the relevant legislature — is recognised in s.28(8) Scotland Act 1998 and equivalent provisions for Wales. In Miller (No 1) the Supreme Court held that the Sewel Convention is a political convention, not a rule of law that the courts can enforce, even where it has been recognised in statute. Treating Sewel as enforceable is one of the most common Public Law mistakes in MCQ banks.

Human Rights Act 1998

The HRA 1998 incorporates the substantive Convention rights into UK law without giving them the status of supreme law.

Vertical scope — section 6

Section 6(1) makes it unlawful for a public authority to act incompatibly with a Convention right. "Public authority" includes courts and tribunals, and "any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature" (functional public authorities — see YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27 for the narrow approach taken).

Section 3 interpretation

Section 3 requires legislation, primary and secondary, to be read and given effect "so far as it is possible to do so" in a way compatible with Convention rights. This is a strong interpretive obligation but cannot rewrite legislation contrary to its grain (see Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 and the limits in R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46).

Section 4 declarations of incompatibility

Where compatible interpretation is not possible, the higher courts may make a declaration of incompatibility. This does not invalidate the legislation; Parliament responds (often by remedial order under s.10).

Section 7 — standing

A person may bring proceedings under s.7 only if they are or would be a "victim" of the unlawful act, applying the Strasbourg "victim" test under Article 34 ECHR. This is narrower than the sufficient interest test for ordinary judicial review under s.31(3) Senior Courts Act 1981. Confusing the two standing tests is one of the highest-frequency MCQ traps.

Convention rights you must know

Articles 2 (life), 3 (prohibition of torture/inhuman/degrading treatment), 5 (liberty and security), 6 (fair trial), 8 (private and family life), 9 (thought, conscience and religion), 10 (expression), 11 (assembly and association), 14 (non-discrimination — only a parasitic right) and Protocol 1 Articles 1 (property), 2 (education) and 3 (free elections).

Positive obligations and horizontal effect

Some rights generate positive obligations on the state (e.g. Osman v United Kingdom (1998) under Article 2). Although the HRA is vertical, in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, the House of Lords developed the tort of misuse of private information in light of Article 8, demonstrating "indirect" horizontal effect through the courts' s.6 duty.

Margin of appreciation and proportionality

In Strasbourg, contracting states enjoy a margin of appreciation; domestically, the analogous doctrine is one of "discretionary area of judgment". Where a Convention right is engaged, the test is proportionality. The four-stage formulation in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 is the standard reference: legitimate aim; rational connection; less intrusive means; fair balance.

Judicial Review

Judicial review is the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court (Administrative Court) over public law decisions. It is concerned with the legality of decisions, not their merits. The court does not substitute its own view for that of the decision-maker; it determines whether the decision was within the powers conferred and made in accordance with public law principles.

The parties

• Claimant — the person bringing the claim (must satisfy the standing test).
• Defendant — the public authority whose decision is challenged.
• Interested party — any person directly affected (CPR 54.1(2)(f)).
• Intervener — a person or body permitted to intervene to assist the court (often NGOs or regulators).

Procedure

CPR Part 54 and the pre-action protocol

The Civil Procedure Rules Part 54 governs JR procedure. The Pre-Action Protocol for Judicial Review requires the claimant (where time allows) to send a letter before claim, with the defendant ordinarily having 14 days to respond.

Permission stage and rolled-up hearings

JR is a two-stage process. The claimant first applies for permission (formerly "leave"). The court may grant or refuse permission on the papers; refusal can be renewed orally. A rolled-up hearing combines the permission and substantive hearings where the case is urgent or borderline.

Standing — the sufficient interest test

Section 31(3) Senior Courts Act 1981 requires "sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates". R v IRC, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 set the modern, liberal approach: standing is to be considered with the merits and the legal context. Public-interest groups have been granted standing where the issue raises a matter of public importance and there is no better-placed claimant. Note: standing under s.7 HRA 1998 is the narrower victim test.

Time limits

JR must be brought "promptly and in any event within 3 months" of the grounds first arising (CPR 54.5). Promptness is independent of and earlier than the 3-month longstop. Planning judicial review has a shorter limit of 6 weeks (CPR 54.5(5)), and procurement challenges have their own 30-day limit under CPR 54.5(6).

Grounds of Review

Lord Diplock's tripartite framework in CCSU — illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety — remains the structure, with proportionality bolted on for human-rights and assimilated-EU-law contexts.

Illegality

The decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates its decision-making power and give effect to it. Sub-categories include:

• Ultra vires — acting beyond the powers conferred (the parent statute).
• Error of law — misinterpretation of the relevant legal framework. Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 abolished the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law.
• Error of fact — limited; recognised for jurisdictional or "precedent" facts and material errors of established fact (E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49).
• Irrelevant considerations / improper purpose — the decision-maker took into account factors it should not have, or acted for a purpose other than that for which the power was conferred (Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997; Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054).
• Fettering discretion — applying a rigid policy without considering the individual case (British Oxygen Co v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610).
• Unlawful delegation — sub-delegation outside what statute permits, subject to the Carltona principle for ministerial decisions taken by civil servants (Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560).

Irrationality

The traditional test is Wednesbury unreasonableness — a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). In human-rights or fundamental-rights contexts, the courts apply anxious scrutiny ("super-Wednesbury") and, where Convention rights or assimilated EU law are engaged, proportionality is the controlling test.

Procedural impropriety

Two streams: failure to observe statutory procedure, and breach of common-law fairness. The duty of fairness was famously broadened in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, away from a narrow focus on judicial bodies. The content of fairness varies with context (Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75). Two key sub-doctrines:

• The rule against bias — actual or apparent bias (the Porter v Magill test of whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude there was a real possibility of bias).
• Legitimate expectations — procedural or substantive expectations may arise from a clear and unambiguous representation. In R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213, the Court of Appeal held that frustration of a substantive legitimate expectation could amount to abuse of power.

Proportionality

Where a Convention right or assimilated-EU-law right is engaged, proportionality applies (Bank Mellat (No 2)). The courts have not yet fully embraced proportionality as a free-standing common-law ground (see the discussion in R (Pham) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19), but in human-rights cases it dominates.

Remedies in Judicial Review

The Administrative Court's principal remedies are discretionary and prerogative in origin (now statutory under s.31 SCA 1981):

• Quashing order — sets aside the impugned decision; the court may remit the matter to the decision-maker.
• Prohibiting order — prevents an unlawful decision being taken.
• Mandatory order — compels a public authority to perform a public-law duty.
• Declaration — a non-coercive statement of the legal position.
• Injunction — interim or final, including against the Crown for human-rights and EU-law-derived obligations.
• Damages — only where there is a parallel private-law cause of action (e.g. tort, breach of statutory duty, HRA s.8). JR alone does not generate damages.

Discretion to refuse remedy

Section 31(2A) SCA 1981 requires the court to refuse a remedy if it appears highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different had the conduct complained of not occurred, unless there are reasons of exceptional public interest to grant relief.

Ouster Clauses and the Modern Position

Ouster clauses purport to exclude judicial review of decisions of a particular body or process. In Anisminic, the House of Lords held that an ouster clause did not protect a decision vitiated by jurisdictional error, because such a "decision" was a nullity. The modern position is that the courts construe ouster clauses very strictly indeed.

In R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, the Supreme Court held by a majority that even a strongly worded ouster could not exclude judicial review of an error of law by an inferior tribunal. The judgment is the most important modern statement on the limits of legislative attempts to exclude review and is examinable in either MCQ or scenario form.

Assimilated/Retained EU Law

After Brexit, EU law in force in the UK on exit day was preserved as "retained EU law" (REUL). The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 (REUL Act 2023):

• Renamed REUL "assimilated law" with effect from 1 January 2024.
• Abolished the supremacy of EU law over domestic law from 1 January 2024 (any conflict is now resolved in favour of domestic law unless an express saving applies).
• Removed general principles of EU law as an aid to interpretation.
• Provided a sunset for a specified list of retained EU instruments and conferred wide powers on ministers to revoke, restate or replace assimilated law by SI.
• Enabled UK courts to depart from retained EU case law more readily where appropriate.

For the SQE1, you need the headline architecture, not the line-by-line transition tables. If a question gives you a regulation that was in force in 2019, the default position is that it survived as retained EU law and is now assimilated law unless something has been done to remove it.

10 Public Law Exam Techniques

1. Identify the legal source first. Statute, prerogative, common law, convention, assimilated EU law? You cannot apply the right rules until you have classified the source.
2. Test prerogative against statute. If a statute covers the field, the prerogative is displaced (De Keyser; Miller (No 1)).
3. Recognise "convention" cues. Sewel, Salisbury, royal assent — all unenforceable. Miller (No 1) makes this explicit.
4. Map the JR ground to CCSU. Do not freelance: every facts pattern resolves into illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety, or proportionality.
5. Pin the time limit. Three months for general JR; six weeks for planning; thirty days for procurement.
6. Match the standing test to the cause of action. Section 31(3) SCA 1981 for ordinary JR; s.7 HRA 1998 victim test for human-rights claims.
7. Use the four-stage Bank Mellat test for proportionality. Examiners reward structured analysis: legitimate aim → rational connection → less intrusive means → fair balance.
8. Quote section numbers, not paraphrases. "Section 6 HRA 1998 makes it unlawful for a public authority…" beats "the HRA stops public bodies acting unlawfully."
9. Distinguish s.3 from s.4 HRA. Section 3 is interpretation; s.4 is a declaration of incompatibility, which does not invalidate the statute.
10. Track the assimilated-law clock. From 1 January 2024, supremacy abolished; from then on, conflicts go to domestic law unless saved.

Common SQE1 Public Law Mistakes

• Treating the Sewel Convention as enforceable. It is not; Miller (No 1) held it was a political convention even when recognised in statute.
• Confusing s.31(3) SCA 1981 with s.7 HRA 1998. The "sufficient interest" test is significantly broader than the Convention "victim" test.
• Saying Jackson limits parliamentary sovereignty. Jackson contains obiter speculation; it did not change the law.
• Asserting "all retained EU law sunset on 31 December 2023". The blanket sunset was dropped; only listed instruments fell away.
• Confusing s.3 with s.4 HRA. Section 3 is a strong interpretive obligation; s.4 is a declaratory remedy that does not invalidate.
• Applying Wednesbury where proportionality should govern. Where a Convention right is engaged, the test is proportionality, not unreasonableness.
• Forgetting the Anisminic/Privacy International limits on ouster clauses. Ouster clauses are construed very strictly; do not assume they do what they say.
• Mislabelling the parties. The claimant brings JR, the defendant is the public authority, and "interested party" has a specific procedural meaning.
• Misstating planning JR time. It is six weeks, not three months.
• Treating royal prerogative as immune from review. GCHQ settled that the prerogative is reviewable subject to subject matter; Miller (No 2) / Cherry extended the principle to prorogation.

How to Structure Your Public Law Revision

You can put Public Law in four focused weeks — three if you already have a law degree.

Week 1 — Constitutional architecture

Sources, parliamentary sovereignty, separation of powers, rule of law. Build a single A4 page that lists the constitutional statutes by date and the Jennings test for conventions. Do 50 quick-quiz questions tagged Public Law to baseline yourself.

Week 2 — Executive power and the HRA

Royal prerogative (GCHQ, Miller (No 1), Miller (No 2) / Cherry); HRA mechanics (ss.3, 4, 6, 7, 8); core Convention rights; Bank Mellat proportionality. Make a flashcards deck for Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 14 with the standard limitations and qualifications.

Week 3 — Judicial review

Procedure, standing, time limits, grounds (drilled exhaustively), remedies, ouster clauses. Spend a day on CCSU sub-grounds; another on procedural fairness and legitimate expectations; another on remedies and s.31(2A). Sit two timed JR scenario blocks.

Week 4 — Devolution, assimilated law, and consolidation

Devolution and Sewel; the architecture of REUL Act 2023; mixed-topic mock under exam conditions. Use spaced repetition to consolidate cases and section numbers, and finish with a revision of all the exam techniques.

If you only have two weeks, compress weeks 1 and 2 into one and spend the second week on JR plus mocks. Do not skip the assimilated-law section; it is the most likely 2026-only update.

For broader Legal System context, work through the Legal System study area alongside this guide.

Final Thoughts

Public Law has a deceptive surface. It looks short, it reads tidy, and the case-law list is finite. But it tests precision: the right test, the right section, the right court, the right post-Brexit clock. Candidates who memorise without structuring lose marks to standing-test confusion, conventions-vs-law confusion, and assimilated-law confusion. Candidates who treat Public Law as "easy" lose marks to overconfidence on prerogative cases. Treat it as a discipline of taxonomy: classify the source, classify the ground, classify the remedy, then write your answer.

If you put the work in across the four weeks above, Public Law turns from a vague worry into one of your most reliable scoring areas on FLK1.

• Drill 30 mixed Public Law questions on /practice/quick-quiz tonight.
• Build a /flashcards deck of section numbers (HRA ss.3, 4, 6, 7; SCA s.31; CRA s.3) and the CCSU grounds.
• Read the How to pass SQE1 in 2026 overview and slot Public Law into your overall plan.
• Cross-reference with the Contract Law revision guide for the private-law half of FLK1.
• Compare topic weights against FLK1 vs FLK2 before you decide how much time to allocate.
• If you are weighing an upgrade, the /pricing page has the topic-bank coverage you will need to drill the grounds of review at depth.
• For external authority, bookmark legislation.gov.uk for statute text and BAILII for case reports.