Not every term in a contract is written down or spoken aloud. The law fills gaps by implying terms — inserting obligations the parties didn't expressly agree to but which the law treats as part of the deal. Terms can be implied by common law (through the courts) or by statute (through legislation). Understanding which route applies, and the different tests involved, is essential for SQE1.
Terms implied 'in fact' are specific to one particular contract — the court asks whether this contract needs the term to work properly. Terms implied 'in law' apply to all contracts of a particular type — the court decides the term is a necessary incident of that category of relationship regardless of the parties' intentions.
The business efficacy test asks: is the implied term necessary to make the contract work? If, without the term, the contract would be commercially absurd or unworkable, the court will imply it. The leading case is The Moorcock (1889), where a wharf owner impliedly undertook that the riverbed was safe for a moored vessel. Without this term, the contract made no commercial sense — no shipowner would pay to moor at an unsafe berth.
The officious bystander test, from Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926), asks: if an officious bystander had suggested the term to the parties at the time of contracting, would they both have said 'Oh, of course!'? The term must be so obvious that it goes without saying. If either party might not have agreed, the term cannot be implied. In Marks & Spencer plc v BNP Paribas (2015), the Supreme Court confirmed both tests must be satisfied and stressed that a term will not be implied merely because it would be reasonable — it must be necessary.
A common mistake is thinking a term will be implied simply because it seems fair or reasonable. The Supreme Court in Marks & Spencer v BNP Paribas (2015) firmly rejected this. The term must be necessary for business efficacy or so obvious it goes without saying. Many exam candidates lose marks by applying a reasonableness test instead.
A term may be implied if it reflects a well-known custom or usage of a particular trade, market, or locality. The custom must be notorious (widely known), certain, reasonable, and not inconsistent with the express terms of the contract. For example, in Hutton v Warren (1836) a term was implied based on agricultural custom that a tenant should receive an allowance for seeds and labour on quitting.
Unlike terms implied in fact (which depend on the specific parties' presumed intentions), terms implied in law are imposed by the court as a legal incident of a particular type of relationship. The test is whether the term is a necessary incident of the type of contract in question. The leading case is Liverpool City Council v Irwin (1977), where the House of Lords implied an obligation on a local authority landlord to take reasonable care to maintain the common parts of a tower block — not because of the parties' intentions, but because such a duty was a necessary feature of that type of tenancy.
| Feature | Implied in Fact | Implied in Law |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Specific to this contract | All contracts of this type |
| Test | Business efficacy / officious bystander | Necessary incident of the relationship |
| Key cases | The Moorcock; Shirlaw v Southern Foundries | Liverpool City Council v Irwin |
| Basis | Presumed intention of the parties | Policy — what the law requires |
| Flexibility | Parties can exclude by express terms | Harder to exclude; may be overridden by statute |
Parliament has enacted several statutes that imply terms into particular categories of contract. The most important for SQE1 are the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA), the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (SGSA), and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA). The SGA and SGSA apply to business-to-business (B2B) contracts, while the CRA governs business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts.
The implied terms as to satisfactory quality (s.14(2)) and fitness for purpose (s.14(3)) only apply where the seller sells in the course of a business. A private sale (e.g. selling your old car to a neighbour) does not attract these protections. Section 12 (title) and s.13 (description) apply to all sales.
The SGSA 1982 also implies terms as to title, description, quality, and fitness for purpose into contracts for the transfer of goods (e.g. work and materials contracts) and hire contracts under ss.2–5 and ss.7–10 respectively, mirroring the SGA 1979 provisions.
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 replaced the consumer provisions of the SGA and SGSA for B2C contracts. It implies terms (called 'statutory rights') into contracts for goods, digital content, and services between a trader and a consumer. If the trader breaches these rights, the consumer has a tiered system of remedies.
| Category | Key Implied Terms | CRA Sections |
|---|---|---|
| Goods | Satisfactory quality, fitness for purpose, match description, match sample/model, right to supply, installation as part of conformity | ss.9–17 |
| Digital content | Satisfactory quality, fitness for purpose, match description, rights to supply | ss.34–41 |
| Services | Reasonable care and skill, information said or written is binding, reasonable price, reasonable time | ss.49–52 |
A frequent exam trap: the SGA 1979 and SGSA 1982 now only apply to B2B and private sales. For B2C sales of goods, digital content, or services, the CRA 2015 governs. Always identify whether the contract is B2B or B2C before selecting the correct statute.
An exemption clause is a term that seeks to exclude or limit a party's liability for breach of contract or negligence. There are two main types: exclusion clauses (which remove liability altogether) and limitation clauses (which cap liability at a specified amount or restrict the available remedies). The law subjects exemption clauses to a three-stage analysis: (1) Has the clause been incorporated into the contract? (2) As a matter of construction, does it cover the breach that occurred? (3) Is it rendered void or unenforceable by statute (UCTA 1977 or CRA 2015)?
Always apply the three-stage analysis in order: incorporation, then construction, then statutory validity. If the clause fails at any stage, there is no need to consider the remaining stages. This structured approach scores well in exams.
Under the contra proferentem rule, any ambiguity in an exemption clause is construed against the party seeking to rely on it (the proferens). If the clause could bear two meanings, the court adopts the interpretation less favourable to the party who drafted it. This is particularly strict where the clause attempts to exclude liability for negligence.
Canada Steamship Lines v The King (1952) laid down guidelines for construing exemption clauses that allegedly cover negligence: (1) If the clause expressly mentions negligence (or a synonym), effect is given to it. (2) If there is no express reference to negligence, the court asks whether the words used are wide enough, in their ordinary meaning, to cover negligence. (3) If so, the court then asks whether the clause might cover a non-negligence-based liability. If there is an alternative head of liability the clause could apply to, it will be construed as applying to that other liability rather than to negligence.
In the modern law, the Supreme Court in Persimmon Homes Ltd v Ove Arup (2017) and other cases has emphasised that exemption clauses should be construed in the same way as any other contractual term, applying the principles from Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society (1998). The contra proferentem rule remains relevant but the courts now focus on what the clause means in context, read as a whole, rather than applying a hostile construction. Between commercial parties of equal bargaining power, the court is less inclined to strain against the natural meaning of a clause.
Despite its name, UCTA 1977 does not deal with unfair terms generally — it deals specifically with exemption clauses (exclusion and limitation of liability). It applies primarily to 'business liability', meaning liability arising from things done in the course of a business or from occupation of business premises (s.1(3)). Since the CRA 2015, UCTA no longer applies to consumer contracts — it is now a B2B statute only.
Section 2(1): A person cannot by reference to any contract term or notice exclude or restrict liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence. This is an absolute ban — no reasonableness test applies. Section 2(2): For other loss or damage (e.g. property damage, economic loss) caused by negligence, liability can only be excluded or restricted insofar as the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness (s.11).
Any attempt to exclude or limit liability for death or personal injury caused by negligence is automatically void under UCTA s.2(1). This is one of the most commonly tested rules. There is no reasonableness defence — the clause is simply struck out.
Section 3 applies where one party deals on the other's written standard terms of business (or, before CRA 2015, where one party dealt as consumer). Where s.3 applies, the party relying on their standard terms cannot: (a) exclude or restrict liability for their own breach, or (b) claim to be entitled to render a contractual performance substantially different from that reasonably expected, or to render no performance at all — except insofar as the clause satisfies the reasonableness test.
Section 6 controls exemption clauses in sale of goods contracts: s.6(1): The implied term as to title (SGA s.12) can never be excluded or restricted. s.6(1A): The implied terms as to description (s.13), satisfactory quality (s.14), fitness for purpose (s.14), and sample (s.15) can be excluded or restricted in a B2B contract but only if the term is reasonable.
Section 7 mirrors s.6 for contracts that are not sales of goods but involve a transfer of goods (e.g. hire, work and materials). The implied term as to title cannot be excluded. The implied terms as to description, quality, fitness, and sample can only be excluded if reasonable.
Section 11(1) provides that a term must be fair and reasonable having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. The burden of proving reasonableness falls on the party seeking to rely on the clause (s.11(5)). For limitation clauses, s.11(4) directs the court to consider the resources available to meet the liability and the availability of insurance.
In practice, courts also weigh: (a) whether the parties are of equal bargaining power, (b) the availability of insurance and who is the cheaper insurer, (c) industry practice — is the clause standard in the trade?, and (d) whether the clause was negotiated or a 'take it or leave it' standard form. See Smith v Eric S Bush (1990) and George Mitchell v Finney Lock Seeds (1983).
| Section | Subject | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| s.2(1) | Negligence — death/personal injury | Cannot be excluded (absolute ban) |
| s.2(2) | Negligence — other loss/damage | Subject to reasonableness test |
| s.3 | Written standard terms — breach / different performance | Subject to reasonableness test |
| s.6(1) | SGA s.12 — title | Cannot be excluded (absolute ban) |
| s.6(1A) | SGA ss.13–15 — description, quality, fitness, sample (B2B) | Subject to reasonableness test |
| s.7 | SGSA implied terms (B2B) | Title: absolute ban; others: reasonableness test |
Part 2 of the CRA 2015 (ss.61–76) replaces the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 and removes consumer contracts from UCTA's scope. It applies to contracts between a trader and a consumer. Unlike UCTA (which targets only exemption clauses), Part 2 CRA can render any term unfair, including terms about price escalation, penalties, or variation rights — not just exclusion and limitation clauses.
Under s.62 CRA, a term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer. In assessing fairness, the court considers the nature of the subject matter, all the circumstances existing at the time the term was agreed, and all the other terms of the contract or any other contract on which it depends (s.62(5)).
Section 64 CRA provides that a term relating to the main subject matter of the contract or the adequacy of the price cannot be assessed for fairness — but only if it is transparent and prominent. 'Transparent' means in plain and intelligible language and legible (s.64(3)). 'Prominent' means brought to the consumer's attention in such a way that an average consumer would be aware of the term (s.64(4)). If a core term is not transparent and prominent, it can be assessed for fairness like any other term. This codified and extended the approach in Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National (2009).
Schedule 2 to the CRA 2015 contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list ('grey list') of terms that may be regarded as unfair. These include terms that: exclude or limit liability for death/personal injury through negligence; inappropriately exclude legal rights; make the contract binding on the consumer but not the trader; allow the trader to retain sums paid if the consumer cancels but not vice versa; require disproportionate compensation if the consumer fails to perform; allow the trader to vary terms or the product unilaterally; and many others.
Under s.67 CRA, an unfair term is not binding on the consumer. However, the contract continues to exist so far as it is capable of continuing without the unfair term. The consumer can still rely on the term if they choose to. This is a key difference from UCTA, where void terms simply have no effect at all.
Certain terms are automatically unfair under the CRA and cannot be saved by any reasonableness or fairness argument. Section 31 provides that a trader cannot exclude or restrict liability for breach of the implied terms as to goods (ss.9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17). Section 47 does the same for digital content terms. Section 57 prevents exclusion of the implied term of reasonable care and skill in services contracts.
| Feature | UCTA 1977 | CRA 2015 Part 2 |
|---|---|---|
| Applies to | B2B contracts only (since CRA 2015) | B2C contracts (trader to consumer) |
| Scope | Exemption clauses only | Any term can be assessed for fairness |
| Test | Reasonableness (s.11) | Fairness — good faith, significant imbalance (s.62) |
| Core terms | No specific exclusion | Excluded from assessment if transparent and prominent (s.64) |
| Grey list | No grey list | Schedule 2 — indicative list of potentially unfair terms |
| Effect | Void | Not binding on consumer; contract continues if possible |
| Burden of proof | On party relying on clause | On trader to show term is fair |
When dealing with an exemption clause in a problem question, apply the three stages in order. First, has the clause been incorporated into the contract (by signature, reasonable notice, or course of dealing)? Second, as a matter of construction (using the contra proferentem rule and the Canada Steamship guidelines), does the clause cover the loss that actually occurred? Third, is the clause rendered void or unenforceable by UCTA 1977 (if B2B) or CRA 2015 Part 2 (if B2C)? A clause that fails at any stage is ineffective.
In an SQE1 question involving an exemption clause, identify: (1) the type of contract (B2B or B2C), (2) the type of loss (death/personal injury vs other), (3) the basis of liability (negligence vs strict/contractual), and (4) whether the clause is an exclusion or a limitation. These factors determine which statutory rules apply and whether the clause is absolutely banned, subject to reasonableness/fairness, or potentially valid.